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THE UNNECESSARY RULE OF CONSISTENCY IN
CONSPIRACY TRIALS
CHAD W. COULTERt
A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored
by little statesmen and philosophers and divines.
-Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance.*
While symmetry of results may be intellectually satisfying, it
is not required.
-Burger, C.J., in Standefer v. United States.**
Consider the following hypothetical: Fran, a thirty-year-old col-
lege custodian with a long history of narcotics violations, approaches
Nan, a freshman at the college, with a plan to provide Nan with co-
caine for distribution at the college. Nan agrees to sell the cocaine de-
spite a total lack of experience in the area, after Fran convinces her
that the profits from the scheme will pay her way through college. Af-
ter only a few sales, though, Nan's roommate, Jan, who has witnessed
several transactions, informs the college administration of the arrange-
ment, and Fran and Nan are indicted by a federal grand jury, inter
alia, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. Jan, as the
star witness for the prosecution, leaves the jury with no doubt that the
elements of a conspiracy are in fact present. Accordingly, the jury con-
victs Fran. It acquits Nan, however, moved by her youth and lack of
criminal record, by her passive role in the affair, and by its view that
Nan was "punished enough" by her removal from the college. Follow-
ing this verdict, Fran moves for acquittal, arguing that Nan's acquittal
is inconsistent with her conviction. Under current federal law, Fran
will almost certainly succeed. According to the common law rule of
consistency1 in conspiracy trials, "where all but one of the charged con-
spirators are acquitted, the verdict against the one will not stand."
'2
t B.A. 1984, Haverford College; J.D. Candidate 1987, University of
Pennsylvania.
* R.W. EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS, FIRST SERIES (1841).
** 447 U.S. 10, 25 (1980).
Although this term is not generically applied by courts recognizing the doctrine,
for purposes of simplicity it will be used throughout this Comment.
2 United States v. Albert, 675 F.2d 712, 713 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Herman v.
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The rule of consistency is subject, however, to several major limi-
tations. First, many courts refuse to apply the rule where conspirators
are tried separately, since inconsistent results in this context can be ex-
plained by differences in jury composition, proof offered at the trials, or
other factors.' Similarly, application of the rule does not apply to a lone
conspirator's conviction if the co-conspirators' cases were not disposed
of on the merits." Finally, the rule of consistency can be avoided where
it is shown that a defendant, despite the acquittal of all indicted co-
conspirators, conspired with "persons unknown."5 In the above hypo-
thetical, however, because Fran and Nan, like most co-conspirators,
were tried jointly, and none of the other exceptions apply, the acquittal
of Nan will result in the acquittal of Fran as well.
The logic underlying the rule of consistency and its exceptions is
not difficult to grasp. The essence of the common law crime of conspir-
acy is an agreement between two persons to commit a criminal offense.
6
According to the Fifth Circuit, "the acquittal of all but one potential
conspirator negates the possibility of an agreement between the sole re-
maining defendant and one of those acquitted of the conspiracy and
thereby denies, by definition, the existence of any conspiracy at all.''7
Under this reasoning, the conspiracy conviction of a lone defendant is
invalid because the "verdict . . .itself den[ies] the existence of the es-
sential facts" 8 constituting a conspiracy.
United States, 289 F.2d 362, 368 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 897 (1961)).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d 328, 333 (5th Cir. 1980);
Gardner v. State, 286 Md. 520, 527-28, 408 A.2d 1317, 1321 (1979); Platt v. State,
143 Neb. 131, 142-43, 8 N.W.2d 849, 855 (1943).
4 For example, a grant of immunity to one conspirator does not preclude the con-
viction of the other, see Farnsworth v. Zerbst, 98 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1938), nor
does disposition of another's case by nolle prosqui, see United States v. Fox, 130 F.2d
56, 59 (3d Cir. 1942). But see State v. Jackson, 7 S.C. 283, 288 (1876) (effect of
disposition of one charge by nolle prosqui is to "discontinue the [other] charge"). A
defendant's conviction is not precluded by the death or disappearance of the defendant's
alleged co-conspirators. See Rosenthal v. United States, 45 F.2d 1000, 1003 (8th Cir.
1930); People v. Nail, 242 Ill. 284, 292, 89 N.E. 1012, 1016 (1909).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 651 F.2d 1255, 1258 (8th Cir. 1981); see also P.
MARCUS, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY CASES § 2.03, at
2-10 n.4 (1985) ("Many indictments ...now 'contain the catch-all charge that de-
fendants were also involved with other persons unknown.' ") (quoting People v. James,
189 Cal. App. 2d 14, 16, 10 Cal. Rptr. 809, 810 (1961)).
6 See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 375 (1951) ("Of course, at least two
persons are required to constitute a conspiracy."); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982) (A federal
conspiracy requires "agreement between two persons."); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 61, at 453-54 (1972); cf. United States v. Standefer,
610 F.2d 1076, 1099 (3d Cir. 1979) (Aldisert, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating
that in an aiding and abetting case "you cannot clap with one hand; it takes two to
tango"), affd, 447 U.S. 10 (1980).
* United States v. Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d 328, 331 (5th Cir. 1980).
8 United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 1929).
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The rule of consistency, at least as applied to joint conspiracy tri-
als, is followed uniformly in both the federal and state courts.' A panel
of the Third Circuit recently suggested, however, that "the rule of con-
sistency may be a vestige of the past."10 This Comment argues that the
logical foundations of the rule of consistency are incompatible with the
Supreme Court's understanding and approval of inconsistent verdicts as
established, in Dunn v. United States," recently reaffirmed in United
States v. Powell,'2 and as applied in Standefer v. United States.'
In Standefer, the Court recognized that a jury acquittal of an al-
leged principal in a separate trial was not dispositive of an accessory's
noninvolvement in the criminal transaction; an acquittal may result
from factors entirely unrelated to a defendant's guilt or innocence, such
as jury lenity and the inadmissibility of evidence. In contrast, the fun-
damental premise of the rule of consistency is that a defendant's acquit-
tal proves absolutely that she was not involved in the conspiracy at
issue. Because the possibility that different evidence will be admissible
as to different defendants and that jury acquittals will be due to extra-
legal factors is present in the conspiracy context as well as in the prin-
cipal/accessory context at issue in Standefer, a jury acquittal should
not be interpreted as a verdict of innocence in either case. Therefore,
the rule of consistency should no longer be applied in either joint or
separate conspiracy trials, and acquittal of one conspirator should be of
no legal relevance to the conviction of the other conspirator. Instead,
review of an inconsistent conspiracy conviction should be limited to ex-
amination of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction.
Part I of this Comment discusses the common law origins of the
rule of consistency and demonstrates that the historical conditions sur-
rounding its development no longer exist and that the rule is irrelevant
and inappropriate in the modern legal context. Part II analyzes the
rule of consistency in the context of the Standefer decision, in which
the Court declined to require consistency in the results of separate trials
of an alleged principal and his accessory, and concludes that the same
I See Annotation, Prosecution or Conviction of One Conspirator as Affected by
Disposition of Case Against Coconspirators, 19 A.L.R.4TH 192, 198-201 (1983).
'0 Government of the Virgin Islands v. Hoheb, 777 F.2d 138, 142 n.6 (3d Cir.
1985).
1 284 U.S. 390 (1932) (approving inconsistent verdicts for related charges of un-
lawful possession and sale of alcohol and maintenance of a nuisance by keeping alcohol
for sale during the prohibition era).
12 469 U.S. 57 (1984) (approving inconsistent verdicts for related charges of pos-
session of cocaine with intent to distribute, conspiracy to do so, and use of the telephone
to facilitate narcotics violations).
13 447 U.S. 10 (1980) (approving inconsistent verdicts in separate conspiracy tri-
als of an alleged principal and his accessory).
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rule should be applied in the conspiracy context.
I. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE RULE OF CONSISTENCY
The conspiracy rule of consistency, like the crime from which it is
derived, is firmly rooted in the common law. There is, however, consid-
erable debate over the validity of the crime of conspiracy itself.1 4 One
commentator has characterized the development of the law in the area
as "a veritable quicksand of shifting opinion and ill-considered
thought."1 " The common law development of the rule of consistency
and its subsequent importation into American criminal law also fit this
description. Although the rule may originally have served a beneficial
purpose, it lacks value in the context of the modern American criminal
justice system.
A. The Development of the Rule of Consistency in England
In the late nineteenth century, Lord Coleridge observed that the
rule that two conspirators "both must be convicted or both must be
acquitted . . . [was] determined, or, if not determined, taken for
granted from very early times.""0 The lineage of the rule can be traced
back almost four centuries to the case of Marsh v. Vauhan.17 In that
case, two defendants were indicted and tried jointly for conspiracy, with
the result that one was convicted, and the other acquitted. The court
quashed the lone defendant's conviction, reasoning in a paragraph-long
opinion that "one cannot conspire alone." ' By the late nineteenth cen-
tury, subsequent decisions addressing this issue had firmly planted the
Marsh rule into the common law.19
"4 See Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Practice,
65 GEO. L.J. 925, 926-27 nn. 3-7 (1977) (citing sources supporting and opposing the
crime of conspiracy).
5 Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1922.). See generally
Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 1137 (1973) (ad-
vocating abolition of the crime of conspiracy).
" R. v. Manning, [1883] 12 Q.B.D. 241, 245, quoted in R. v. Shannon, [1974] 2
All E.R. 1009, 1013 (C.A. 1973).
17 78 Eng. Rep. 937 (Q.B. 1599); cf. Harison v. Errington, 79 Eng. Rep. 1291,
1292 (Q.B. 1627) (stating that because the crime of riot requires participation by three,
a conviction of only one is invalid).
18 Marsh, 78 Eng. Rep. at 937.
19 See, e.g., R. v. Grimes, 87 Eng. Rep. 142 (K.B. 1688) (When two conspirators
are indicted jointly, the acquittal of one is the acquittal of both.); R. v. Kinnersley, 93
Eng. Rep. 467, 469 (K.B. 1719) (One conspirator may be tried before another, but the
later acquittal of the other would vindicate both.); R. v. Niccolls, 93 Eng. Rep. 1148
(K.B. 1-745) ("[Clontradictory verdicts" are not possible where one of two conspirators
is dead.); R. v. Cooke, 108 Eng. Rep. 201, 204 (K.B. 1826) (Where only one of two
conspirators is convicted with the trial of the third pending, "[i]f the other defendant
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In the 1974 case of R. v. Shannon,2 ° the British Court of Appeal,
Criminal Division and, on review, the House of Lords, conducted ex-
haustive examinations of these decisions. The appeals court reluctantly
adhered to the rule of consistency in quashing the defendant's convic-
tion pursuant to a guilty plea where his alleged co-conspirator was sub-
sequently acquitted. The House of Lords held that the rule did not
apply in this context and restored the conviction. Both courts' historical
analyses concluded that the "fundamental principle" articulated in
Marsh-that a conspiracy requires agreement by two-ultimately led
to the British courts' acceptance of the rule of consistency.2" The link
between the plurality requirement of conspiracy and the rule of consis-
tency, however, is tenuous. For example, in R. v. Thompson,22 A, B,
and C were indicted and tried jointly for conspiracy. The jury convicted
A but acquitted both B and C, saying that although it was certain that
A had conspired with one of the two, it was not certain which. The
court held that since both of A's alleged co-conspirators had been ac-
quitted, the verdict against A could not stand, although the court ex-
pressed regret that A should "escape" as the result of such a rule.23
Clearly, this situation is incompatible with the underlying premise
of the rule of consistency-that a jury acquittal of all but one defendant
presents the impossible result that the lone convicted defendant con-
spired with herself. In Thompson, the jury clearly articulated its cer-
tainty of the existence of a criminal agreement between two persons
and its certainty of the participation in that agreement by the defendant
it convicted. Since the verdict cannot be interpreted as a conclusion by
the jury that the defendant conspired alone, the court's application of
the rule of consistency is difficult to justify.2"
The development of the rule of consistency, however, actually had
more to do with the pre-twentieth century English system of criminal
appellate review than with the rule's logical foundation. Prior to 1907,
a criminal defendant could seek review of a conviction only through a
[is] hereafter acquitted, perhaps [the conviction] may be reversed."); R. v. Thompson,
117 Eng. Rep. 1100, 1105 (Q.B. 1851) (When ajury acquits two of three conspirators,
the conviction of the third cannot stand.).
20 [1974] 2 All E.R. 1009 (C.A. 1973), conviction restored, [1974] 2 All E.R:
1025 (H.L. 1974).
21 See id. at 1013 (C.A.), 1048 (H.L.).
22 117 Eng. Rep. 1100 (Q.B. 1851).
22 See id. at 1106.
24 For perhaps the most extreme example of the application of the rule, see R. v.
Plummer, [1902] 2 K.B. 339, 345, where the court invalidated a conspiracy conviction
pursuant to a guilty plea after the defendant's two alleged co-conspirators were acquit-
ted. Contra State v. Oats, 32 N.J. Super. 435, 108 A.2d 641 (App. Div. 1954). The
Plummer result was expressly overruled in Shannon. See [1974] 2 All E.R. at 1025
(H.L.).
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writ of error. Under this system, judicial review was limited to an ap-
praisal of the formal record of the case-"the arraignment, the plea,
the issue and the verdict."'25 The inability of appellate courts to secure
justice through review of the most common sources of trial error, such
as wrongly admitted evidence or jury misdirections,26 forced these
courts to "adopt a strict and technical approach to errors on the record
as a means of widening the process of review."
'2
Thus the development of the rule of consistency must be viewed in
the context of the appellate system in which it arose.2' A conspiracy
trial verdict showing the acquittal of one conspirator and the conviction
of the other presented an inconsistency on the face of the record. Since
the reviewing court was entirely unable to examine the substance of the
proceedings leading to such a result, the conclusion that a "technically"
wrong verdict was invalid as a matter of law29 ultimately represented
the only method of protecting a criminal defendant against jury
prejudice or misapplication of the law."° Thus, the rule of consistency
worked as a quasi-appellate method of review for courts with little
other recourse.
In 1907, however, review by writ of error was abolished in Eng-
land by the Criminal Appeal Act.31 For the first time, the reviewing
court was permitted to look beyond the formal record of the case and
correct any errors arising in the trial proceedings. As the court in Shan-
non concluded:
Where only the record could be looked at, it was no doubt
right to give great weight to repugnancy but now since 1907
as the evidence can be examined and regard had to what
actually took place at the trial, there seems no valid reason
why such importance should be attached to the appearance
of repugnancy on the record. 2
The judges particularly stressed the appellate courts' post-1907 ability
25 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 215 (7th ed. 1956); see also
Nissenbaum v. State, 135 Me. 393, 395-396, 197 A. 915, 917 (1938) (stating that "[a]
writ of error is based upon the record facts alone").
21 See W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 25, at 215-16.
" Shannon, [1974] 2 All E.R. at 1020 (C.A.).
28 See Shannon, [1974] 2 All E.R. at 1030 (H.L.).
29 See, e.g., R. v. Plummer, [1902] 2 K.B. 339, 346 ("One being acquitted on
record, the conviction of his companion on the same record must be directly repugnant
and contradictory to the other.") (quoting R. v. Nichols, 104 Eng. Rep. 429, 430 n.a
(K.B. 1742)).
20 See Shannon, [1974] 2 All E.R. at 1030 (H.L.).
31 Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, ch. 23, § 20(1).
38 Shannon, [19741 2 All E.R. at 1040 (H.L.).
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to determine whether differential admissibility of evidence as between
two defendants in fact produced inconsistencies more apparent than
real 3 and concluded that the rule of consistency was inapplicable to
separate trials of co-conspirators. ' The Shannon result was subse-
quently codified and extended to joint trials in the Criminal Law Act of
1977. 3
5
B. Treatment of the Rule of Consistency in American Courts
The logical and historical foundations of the rule of consistency
have seldom been questioned by American courts, aside from the issue
of the rule's applicability to separate trials. 6 A notable and instructive
exception, however, is the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v.
Espinosa-Cerpa.7 Although the facts of this case fit neatly within the
"separate trials" exception to the rule, the court questioned the sound-
ness of the rule itself. Noting that the rule of consistency "undoubtedly
was originally simply transplanted from the English system,"38 the
court concluded that the review by the House of Lords in Shannon of
the origins of the rule of consistency in the writ system "makes abun-
dantly clear its inappropriateness to a modern American criminal jus-
s See id. at 1029.
, The facts of Shannon did not present for resolution the issue of the applicabil-
ity of the rule to an inconsistent verdict rendered by a single jury.
35 Criminal Law Act, 1977, ch. 45.
The fact that the ... persons who ... were the only other parties to the
agreement on which [any person's conspiracy] conviction was based have
been acquitted of conspiracy by reference to that agreement (whether after
being tried with the person convicted or separately) shall not be a ground
for quashing the conviction unless under all the circumstances of the case
his conviction is inconsistent with the acquittal of the other. . . persons in
question.
Id. § 5(8). In 1980, the British Court of Appeal, Criminal Division noted that this Act
"complet[ed] the process begun . . . in R. v. Shannon . . . of abandoning the well-
established [rule of consistency]." R. v. Holmes, [19801 2 All E.R. 458, 461 (C.A.).
The British view of what constitutes problematic inconsistency is actually much stricter
than the American view. Compare R. v. Drury, 56 Crim. App. 104, 114 (1972) (When
counts of theft and obtaining by deception depended upon the same facts, jury convic-
tion on only the latter was quashed.) with United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 69
(1984) (upholding jury conviction for telephone facilitation of narcotics violations even
though same jury acquitted defendant of narcotics violations).
3' See supra notes 3 & 10 and accompanying text.
3 630 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Government of the Virgin Islands v.
Hoheb, 777 F.2d 138, 142 n.6 (3d Cir. 1985) (indicating that the continuing validity of
the rule of consistency is questionable); id. at 143 (Garth, J., concurring) (arguing that
the rule of consistency should be abandoned).
38 Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d at 332 n.5. This assertion seems to be correct. See
Feder v. United States, 257 F. 694, 696 (2d Cir. 1919); State v. Tom, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.)
569, 574-78 (1830); Casper v. State, 47 Wis. 535, 543-44, 2 N.W. 1117, 1119 (1879)
(all invoking the rule of consistency based on English precedent).
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tice system in which all verdicts obviously are, and always have been,
subject to independent review for evidentiary support." 9
The Supreme Court, however, has not acted under its supervisory
power over the federal courts to foreclose the application of the conspir-
acy rule of consistency. In fact, the Court itself has on at least one
occasion reversed a conspiracy conviction on the ground of inconsis-
tency.40 In Standefer v. United States,41 however, the Court upheld a
conviction for aiding and abetting the commission of a federal offense
despite the prior acquittal of the alleged principal.42 The Court has not
attempted to reconcile the tension between its earlier application of the
rule of consistency and its decision in Standefer.
II. THE RULE OF CONSISTENCY Is NOT CONSISTENT
WITH Standefer
The factors underlying the Standefer decision indicate that the
rule of consistency is no longer tenable in joint or separate conspiracy
trials. The Standefer decision rested on the differential admissibility of
evidence as between defendants and the existence of jury lenity leading
to inconsistent verdicts. These problems are also present when conspir-
ators are tried jointly.
A. The Standefer Decision and the Rule of Consistency
In Standefer v. United States,4" the Supreme Court considered the
effect of an alleged principal's acquittal on the case against his acces-
sory. The defendant had been convicted of aiding and abetting an Inter-
nal Revenue Service agent in accepting illegal payments. The agent,
however, had been previously tried and acquitted of receiving the illegal
payments. In felony cases under common law, "an accessory could not
39 Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d at 333 n.5.
40 In Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944), the Court held that the trial
court's setting aside of the convictions of all of a defendant's alleged conspirators
"make[s] it impossible to sustain [the] . . .conviction upon .. the conspiracy count."
Id. at 682 n.3. Other cases in which the Court arguably applied the rule of consistency
are Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 93 (1934) and Gebardi v. United States, 287
U.S. 112, 122 (1932). It appears equally possible, though, that as one commentator
noted with regard to Gebardi, these cases do not rely on the rule, but merely reverse
conspiracy convictions because "all of the other alleged participants could not have been
guilty of conspiracy as a matter of law." Note, Developments in the Law-Criminal
Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 974 n.400 (1959); cf. Shuttlesworth v. Birming-
ham, 373 U.S. 262 (1963) (When the law violated by the principal is constitutionally
invalid, the conviction of the accessory cannot stand.).
41 447 U.S. 10 (1980).
42 See id. at 20.
43 447 U.S. 10 (1980).
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be convicted without the prior conviction of the principal offender."' 4
The Supreme Court did not follow this common law rule in Standefer;
rather, it held, without dissent, that a principal's prior acquittal is ir-
relevant to the prosecution of the accessory and therefore affirmed the
conviction. The defendant argued that the federal aiding and abetting
statute45 did not authorize this result. The Court's analysis of the legis-
lative history of the statute, however, led it to conclude that Congress
intended to make "all participants in conduct violating a federal crimi-
nal statute . . . punishable for their criminal conduct; the fate of other
participants is irrelevant."' 6 Further, the defendant contended that the
doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel prevented the prosecution.
Under this doctrine, a party may not assert a claim it has previously
lost against another defendant.' The defendant argued that the IRS
agent's prior acquittal barred the government from relitigating the issue
of the agent's guilt in connection with the defendant's own prosecution.
The Court rejected this argument, holding that the application of non-
mutual collateral estoppel against the criminal prosecution was entirely
inappropriate.48 This conclusion implicitly recognizes that a verdict of
not guilty is not a verdict of innocence and that no particular meaning
can be attached to a jury acquittal. The Court noted that inconsistent
results in separate trials may arise from several factors unrelated to the
guilt or innocence of the respective defendants, such as evidence admis-
sible against one but not the other,49 or the exercise of lenity by a jury
with respect to one Qf the defendants. 50 The inability of a court to in-
terpret the meaning of a jury acquittal, then, underlies the Court's con-
clusion that although the rejection of nonmutual collateral estoppel in
criminal cases may on occasion produce seemingly inconsistent results,
"symmetry of results may be intellectually satisfying, [but] . . .is not
required.""1
The Standefer decision casts serious doubt on the application of
the rule of consistency, where conspirators are tried separately. As the
court in United States v. Espinosa-Cerpa52 noted, application of the
rule in this context "would be blatantly inconsistent with the Supreme
44 Id. at 15.
46 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
46 Standefer, 447 U.S. at 20.
4' See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329 (1979). See generally
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 320-350
(1971) (discussing the evolution of the nonmutual collateral estoppel doctrine).
48 See Standefer, 447 U.S. at 22-26.
49 Id. at 23-24.
50 Id. at 22-23.
51 Id. at 25.
52 630 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Court's decision in Standefer. Whether or not labelled as nonmutual
collateral estoppel, it would operate in an almost identical manner
... 'M Indeed, the position that the prior acquittal of an alleged con-
spirator bars the relitigation in subsequent trials of the fact of her crim-
inal complicity with others is similar to the argument that the Supreme
Court rejected in Standefer.5' Although Standefer concerned the crime
of aiding and abetting rather than that of conspiracy, the reasoning
underlying the decision is equally persuasive in the context of separate
conspiracy trials.
Because the decision in Standefer concerned consistency in the
context of separate trials, the federal circuits continue to apply the rule
of consistency in joint conspiracy cases despite Standefer.5 5 One com-
mentator has explained the rule's persistence in this context as evidence
that "the fact of separate juries reaching separate results" 8 is central to
the application of Standefer. Some courts seem to agree.57 Yet, as sev-
eral other courts have recognized, the factors underlying the Standefer
decision-the jury's prerogative to acquit for any reason and possible
differential admissibility of evidence as between defendants-"apply
with almost equal force against [application of] the common law rule
[of consistency in] a single trial."58 These courts have observed that for
substantially the same reasons that nonmutual collateral estoppel is in-
applicable in the criminal context, the requirement of consistency
53 Id. at 333.
5" See P. MARCUS, supra note 5, at § 2.03, at 2-13 (noting that Standefer reason-
ing is identical to that of courts which have rejected the rule of consistency in separate
trials).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Figueroa, 720 F.2d 1239, 1247 (11th Cir. 1983)
(stating that where codefendant's conspiracy conviction was reversed, defendant was
also entitled to reversal on conspiracy count); United States v. Hopkins, 716 F.2d 739,
748-49 (10th Cir. 1982) (reversing conspiracy conviction where jury acquitted all other
conspirators), withdrawn, 744 F.2d 716 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (dismissing the
conspiracy conviction for insufficient evidence, without mentioning consistency); United
States v. Morales, 677 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1982) (stating that a "conspiracy conviction
of one defendant will not be upheld when all other alleged coconspirators are acquitted
in the same trial"); United States v. Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057, 1062-64 (5th Cir. 1981)
(reversing conspiracy conviction absent evidence of unnamed coconspirator where
named conspirators were acquitted at jury trial), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991 (1982).
5' P. MARCUS, supra note 5, at § 2.03, at 2-14.
57 See, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Hoheb, 777 F.2d 138, 142 n.2
(3d Cir. 1985) (stating that Standefer is not applicable where there are inconsistent
verdicts in a single trial); Hopkins, 716 F.2d at 748 (holding that Standefer does not
apply to inconsistent verdicts rendered by a single jury).
58 United States v. Albert, 675 F.2d 712, 713 (5th Cir. 1982); see also United
States v. Ranney, 719 F.2d 1183, 1186 n.6 (1st Cir. 1983) (stating that most of the
factors cited in Standefer apply equally to joint and separate trials); Espinosa-Cerpa,
630 F.2d at 330-33 (arguing that the principles underlying Standefer generally pre-
clude application of the rule of consistency).
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within a single jury's verdicts is of questionable merit.
B. Differential Admissibility of Evidence as Between Defendants
One of the major obstacles to the application of nonmutual collat-
eral estoppel in the criminal context, the Standefer Court explained, is
that "[lt is frequently true in criminal cases that evidence inadmissible
against one defendant is admissible against another."5' 9 The Court rec-
ognized that when the government was unable to present all of its proof
against one defendant in a previous trial, it would be inappropriate to
foreclose litigation of the issue of that defendant's criminal involvement
with others in its subsequent prosecutions of other defendants against
whom the proof can be admitted.60 This result is logical; an acquittal
obtained by the exclusion of relevant evidence would not afford the gov-
ernment a "full and fair opportunity to litigate"61 and should not pre-
clude litigation of the issue of another defendant's guilt.6 2
The problem of differential admissibility of evidence clearly should
prevent the rule of consistency from operating in separate trials. The
problem also exists, however, where conspirators are tried jointly,63
typical in the majority of cases. The Fifth Circuit's observation that
"[g]enerally, persons jointly indicted should be tried together, especially
in conspiracy cases,"" reflects the general federal policy of joinder of
defendants accused of criminal complicity in the interests of judicial
convenience and economy.6 5 Under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a defendant may seek severance if such joinder
would be prejudicial; however, such severance is within the discretion
of the trial court. 66 "[A] defendant is not automatically entitled to sever-
5 Standefer, 447 U.S. at 23.
60 See id. at 23-24.
61 Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329
(1971).
62 The double jeopardy clause, U.S. CONsT. amend. V, however, would preclude
further litigation against the defendant acquitted. See Kepner v. United States, 195
U.S. 100, 125-34 (1904) (holding that double jeopardy clause bars government appeal
of acquittal).
63 Under the federal rules, defendants may be so joined where "they are alleged to
have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transac-
tions constituting an offense . .." FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b).
" United States v. Wilson, 657 F.2d 755, 765 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 951 (1982).
65 See United States v. Kulp, 365 F. Supp. 747, 765 (E.D. Pa. 1973), affd, 497
F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1974).
68 If denied severance, the defendant must demonstrate on appeal that she is "un-
able to obtain a fair trial without a severance," and that she will suffer "compelling
prejudice against which the trial court will be unable to afford protection." United
States v. Swanson, 572 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 848 (1978).
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ance because the evidence against a codefendant is more damaging than
the evidence against him." '
In many joint conspiracy trials, the evidence of complicity may
vary substantially as between defendants.6 8 In Blumenthal v. United
States,"9 the Supreme Court cited with approval a now standard rem-
edy in such circumstances: the jury should be instructed that "the guilt
or innocence of each defendant must be determined by the jury sepa-
rately. Each defendant has the same right to that kind of consideration
on your part as if he were being tried alone."70 Such an instruction is
designed to limit the "dangers of transference of guilt' " by the jury to
one defendant on the basis of evidence admissible only against another,




Consistency should not be required where a jury is so instructed. In
such cases, if the jury follows its instructions to consider the evidence
separately as against each defendant, 3 it makes little sense to require
that the verdicts against each defendant be consistent. If such a result
were required, a jury might well "ponder . . . [the] observation . ..
that 'The law may sometimes be an ass, but it cannot be so asinine as
that.' ",74 Thus, the rule of consistency is itself inconsistent with the
settled rule that juries are to consider evidence separately as to each
defendant, and that, for this reason, "verdicts against multiple defend-
ants are to be considered separately as to each defendant . . .
The problem of differential admissibility of evidence seriously un-
dermines the application of the rule of consistency in joint conspiracy
trials. A situation discussed by the Court in Standefer illustrates the
difficulties. Where evidence has been obtained against one defendant in
violation of her constitutional rights, for instance in a search and
seizure illegal under the fourth amendment,7 6 the exclusionary rule
87 United States v. Fuel, 583 F.2d 978, 988 (8th Cir. 1978).
'8 See P. MARCUS, supra note 5, at § 6.03 [4](a), at 6-34.
69 332 U.S. 539 (1947).
70 Id. at 560 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Shelton, 669 F.2d 446,
461 (7th Cir.) (noting with approval the trial court's directions to the jury to consider
the evidence separately as to each defendant), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 934 (1982).
71 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 774 (1946).
72 Id. at 773.
7 According to Judge Lumbard of the Second Circuit, juries in multiple defend-
ant cases do in fact take care to isolate evidence with respect to particular defendants.
See Marcus, supra note 14, at 945 n.69.
7' R. v. Shannon, [1974] 2 All E.R. 1009, 1024 (C.A.) (quoting Haughton v.
Smith, [1973] 3 All E.R. 1109, 1121 (H.L.)).
7' United States v. Dunn, 564 F.2d 348, 360 (9th Cir. 1977); see also id. at n.24
(noting that the rule of consistency is an exception to the general rule).
78 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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bars the admission of that evidence against that defendant.". As the
Court noted, however, "the same evidence ...may be admissible
against other parties to the crime 'whose rights were [not] violated,' ",78
and who thus lack standing to assert the exclusionary rule.79 This situ-
ation may also arise where conspiracy defendants are tried jointly.
The requirement of consistency between a jury's conspiracy ver-
dicts is no more tenable than the application of nonmutual collateral
estoppel in the criminal context rejected by the Standefer Court. Inher-
ent in both positions is the fallacious notion that a criminal acquittal is
the equivalent of a verdict of innocence. The court in R. v. Shannon 0
explained the problem inherent in such a proposition and in the rule of
consistency:
The law in action is not concerned with absolute truth, but
with proof. . . in accordance with . . . rules relating to ad-
missibility of evidence. No doubt, in the realm of the abso-
lute, A could not conspire with B without B also conspiring
with A. But it by no means follows that it cannot be proved
forensically that A conspired with B . . .notwithstanding a
total failure of forensic proof, as against B, that B conspired
with A ... 81
Thus, in cases where differential admissibility of evidence exists
between conspiracy defendants, the rule of consistency will operate to
invalidate jury verdicts that, according to the rules of evidence, are not
only possible but appropriate. The rule has been criticized on this
ground by commentators since 186582 and by courts in rejecting the
rule as applied to separate trials. No logical distinction justifies the
rule's application to a joint conspiracy trial, where the evidence
presented against each defendant is similarly susceptible to variance.
7 See United States v. Weeks, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (Evidence obtained
through illegal search and seizure is inadmissible at trial.); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying Weeks to states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment).
7 Standefer, 447 U.S. at 24 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,
171-72 (1969)).
71 See Alderman, 394 U.S. at 171-75 (Defendant cannot invoke the exclusionary
rule as to evidence obtained in violation of another's constitutional rights.); accord
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (stating that illegal search and seizure of a third
person producing damaging evidence against defendant does not infringe upon any of
defendant's fourth amendment rights).
80 [1974] 2 All E.R. 1009 (C.A. 1983), conviction restored, [1974] 2 All E.R.
1025 (H.L. 1974).
81 Id. at 1042 (C.A.).
82 See W. RUSSELL, CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 144-45 (C.S. Greaves 4th ed.
1865); G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW § 213 (3d ed. 1961).
19861
236 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Finally, application of the rule of consistency in joint conspiracy
trials would tend to undermine the rules developed by the Supreme
Court governing a defendant's right to assert the exclusionary rule.
Under the rule of consistency, the acquittal of one defendant, possibly
resulting from the exclusion of evidence, would necessarily involve the
acquittal of the other against whom the evidence was admissible. Cer-
tainly this result subverts the rule that certain constitutional rights
"may not be vicariously asserted"8 by affording a defendant whose
rights were not violated the benefits of suppression-a result con-
demned by the Court in Standefer.
84
The Standefer Court's conclusion that differential admissibility of
evidence as between defendants precludes the application of nonmutual
collateral estoppel should also preclude the application of the rule of
consistency in both separate and joint conspiracy trials where such evi-
dentiary problems exist. Under such circumstances, the rule may oper-
ate to invalidate jury verdicts rendered in accord with both the judge's
instructions and the evidence. Furthermore, the rule serves to extend
the vicarious benefit of suppression of evidence to those who have "suf-
fered no encroachment on [their] liberty," 5 thereby allowing "guilty
defendants to go free without serving any countervailing purpose. '
The rule of consistency should not "remedy" a situation where, accord-
ing to the rules of evidence, no inconsistency is present.
C. Jury Lenity and Inconsistent Verdicts
In many joint conspiracy trials the evidence admitted against each
defendant will be the same.87 In such cases, "'error,' in the sense that
the jury has not followed the court's instructions, most certainly has
occurred" 88 when the jury convicts only one of two or more defendants
in a conspiracy trial. It is difficult to interpret such a result: was the
jury convinced of the guilt of all, but chose for unknown reasons to
acquit particular defendants; did it single out and convict a particular
defendant out of passion or prejudice; or did it simply misunderstand
the plurality requirement of conspiracy?
The rule of consistency is based on the assumption that inconsis-
a Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).
s' See Standefrr, 447 U.S. at 24 n.19; ef. United States v. Azadian, 436 F.2d 81,
82-83 (9th Cir. 1971) (A principal's entrapment defense is not vicariously available to
defendant accessory who was not entrapped.).
as United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076, 1090 (3d Cir. 1979), affd, 447 U.S.
10 (1980).
8I Id.
87 See P. MARCUS, supra note 5, at §6.03 [41[a][i], at 6-34.
88 United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984).
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tent dispositions of conspiracy charges are invalid because they result
from a jury's passion or misunderstanding. In Standefer, however, the
Court rejected this reasoning by holding that the acquittal of a princi-
pal offender does not estop the government from prosecuting an acces-
sory to the alleged criminal offense.8" Citing Dunn v. United States,-9
the Court's seminal statement on inconsistent verdicts, the Standefer
Court noted that since American juries are permitted "to acquit out of
compassion or compromise," 9' a jury acquittal should not preclude liti-
gating the issue of a defendant's guilt for the purposes of subsequent
proceedings against others accused of a joint criminal endeavor involv-
ing that defendant. 2 The Court's refusal to accept an acquittal as proof
of innocence invalidates the premise of the rule of consistency. If a
guilty person may be acquitted, a co-conspirator's acquittal is not nec-
essarily inconsistent with her partner's conviction. The Supreme Court
generally accepts inconsistent verdicts, as demonstrated by its decisions
in Dunn v. United States9s and United States v. Powell. "
1. The Dunn Doctrine of Inconsistent Verdicts
Dunn involved liquor law violations in the prohibition era. Dur-
ing prohibition, juries frequently arrived at verdicts seemingly devoid of
logic. A fairly common result, exemplified by Dunn, was the acquittal
of a defendant on counts of unlawful possession and unlawful sale of
.alcohol, joined with a conviction for maintenance of a nuisance by
keeping alcohol for sale. The liquor laws were unpopular 5 and ulti-
mately were repealed in 1933.6 It is a fair inference that inconsistent
verdicts in liquor law prosecutions reflected juries' unwillingness to ex-
pose defendants to criminal liability for multiple violations of laws that
they did not support.9 7 The federal circuits split on the issue of whether
nuisance convictions were valid notwithstanding acquittals on counts al-
leging the possession and sale of alcohol.9 8
8, See Standefer, 447 U.S. at 21-26.
o 284 U.S. 390 (1932).
91 Standefer, 447 U.S. at 22.
:- See id. at 23.
3 284 U.S. 390 (1932).
- 469 U.S. 57 (1984).
"' See C. MERZ, THE DRY DECADE 208-32, 334 (1969) (discussing public oppo-
sition to prohibition).
98 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
7 There may also be other reasons for an acquittal. See Note, Validity of Incon-
sistent Verdicts, 1961 DUKE L.J. 133, 137 n.15 (juries may hesitate to convict on many
counts when potential liability is high).
98 Compare Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1925) (affirming convic-
tion despite inconsistent verdicts) with John Hohenandel Brewing Co. v. United States,
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The Supreme Court resolved this conflict in Dunn, holding that
the defendant's conviction for a nuisance by keeping alcohol for sale
was valid, irrespective of clearly inconsistent acquittals by the same
jury on charges of possession and sale of alcohol.99 The defendant as-
serted that the acquittal on the possession count rendered the nuisance
conviction inconsistent and invalid, since the proof of both counts "con-
sist[ed] of identical evidence."100 The Court, quoting the Second Cir-
cuit, replied:
"The most that can be said . . . is that the verdict shows
that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not
speak their real conclusions, but . . . not . . . that they were
not convinced of the defendant's guilt. We interpret the ac-
quittal as no more than their assumption of a power . . . to
which they were disposed through lenity."
101
This conclusion seems reasonable, given the circumstances of the case.
The facts of Dunn suggest that the defendant, owner of a "speakeasy,"
was caught redhanded in blatant violation of the liquor laws.10 2 The
public, however, strongly opposed the laws; prohibition would be re-
pealed only three years later. Thus, the Court in Dunn interpretation
of the jury's inconsistent acquittals on the alcohol possession and sales
charges as an exercise of lenity rather than a negation of the facts em-
bodied in these counts was a realistic and sensible appraisal of the ver-
295 F. 489, 490 (3d Cir. 1924) (holding that where verdict was guilty on one count
and not guilty on other counts, the verdict of guilty had to be based on evidence other
than that pleaded in support of the other counts). See also Peru v. United States, 4
F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1925) (holding that inconsistency renders nuisance conviction in-
valid where the identical evidence was introduced to support all counts).
11 See Dunn, 284 U.S. at 393. But see id. at 397-98 (Butler, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that the jury's verdict was necessarily inconsistent).
100 Id. at 392.
101 Id. at 393 (quoting Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir. 1925)).
The Court's holding was also based on the assumption that "[i]f separate indictments
had been presented against the defendant for possession and for maintenance of a nui-
sance, and had been separately tried, . . . an acquittal on one could not be pleaded as
res judicata of the other." Id. Although later cases of the Court have discredited this
notion, see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (When doubt as to defendant's iden-
tity led to acquittal for robbery of one of several victims present at the scene of the
crime, the double jeopardy clause bars prosecution for robbery of another of the vic-
tims.); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948) (Res judicata precludes aiding
and abetting conviction when defendant was previously acquitted of conspiracy on same
facts.), the Court recently affirmed that Dunn "rests on a sound rationale that is inde-
pendent of its theories of res judicata." Powell, 469 U.S. at 64-65.
102 "Two prohibition officers testified they entered the premises . . . [and] . . .
called for drinks . . . which were served over the bar without any apparent attempt at




dict and its surrounding circumstances. In its approval of the jury's
balancing of the law and justice, the Court implicitly recognized the
jury's role as "the voice of the country."'1 0 3 The result in Dunn there-
fore reflects a concomitant reluctance to give a defendant a windfall
exceeding that already obtained through jury lenity-that is, acquittal
on all counts based on the "inconsistency" of convictions on particular
counts with legally questionable acquittals on other counts. The Dunn
case represents a practical and just compromise between "the jury's role
in seeing that the individual gets justice with mercy"'04 and "the im-
portant federal interest in the enforcement of the criminal law."'05
2. United States v. Powell: Reaffirmation and Clarification
of the Dunn Doctrine
Although the Supreme Court has had several occasions to invoke
the Dunn principle,'0 8 the Court has not attempted to elaborate on the
Dunn case's brief explanation until the present decade. Faced with sev-
eral recent circuit decisions which "ha[d] begun to carve exceptions out
of the Dunn rule,"' 07 the Court reassessed the Dunn doctrine of incon-
sistent verdicts in United States v. Powell.'08 Powell is the modern fac-
tual analogue of Dunn. The defendant had been indicted on counts of,
inter alia, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, conspiracy to
do so, and use of the telephone to facilitate narcotics violations.' 0 9 The
Ninth Circuit, without citing Dunn, reversed a jury verdict convicting
103 United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1960).
104 Bickel, Judge and Jury-Inconsistent Verdicts in the Federal Courts, 63
HARV. L. REv. 649, 655 (1950).
1o5 Standefer, 447 U.S. at 24.
108 See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 (1943) (Where jury con-
victed corporate president, but not corporation, of shipping misbranded drugs in inter-
state commerce, inconsistency is not grounds for reversal.); see also Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 101 (1974) (Jury's inability to reach verdict on charge that defend-
ants used mail to distribute allegedly obscene book did not preclude finding that defend-
ants' mailing of advertisements that described how to obtain book constituted distribu-
tion of obscene materials.).
107 Powell, 469 U.S. at 63. As examples of cases in which the circuit courts of
appeals had recognized exceptions to the Dunn rule, the Powell Court referred to:
United States v. Brooks, 703 F.2d 1273, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 1983) (Dunn rule is inap-
plicable where defendant was charged with conspiracy in one count and, in a separate
count, with using a telephone in furtherance of the conspiracy.); United States v.
Morales, 677 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1982) (Where jury found defendant guilty of conspir-
acy to misapply monies of a federally insured bank, but not guilty of the substantive
crime of fraudulent check cashing, such findings constituted plain error.); and United
States v. Hannah, 584 F.2d 27, 30 (3d Cir. 1978) (Government's theory of prosecu-
tion-that acts constituting a felony with which defendant was charged were same acts
constituting an alleged conspiracy-precluded an inconsistent verdict by the jury.).
1os 469 U.S. 57 (1984).
109 See id. at 59-60.
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the defendant on the telephone charge but acquitting on all others,11
following other circuit decisions holding that convictions on this charge
"must be reversed where the conviction on the underlying conspiracy
counts is reversed." '111
The Supreme Court, in an unanimous decision, reversed the
Ninth Circuit and reinstated the defendant's telephone facilitation con-
viction. In doing so, the Court rejected the line of circuit decisions at-
tempting to distinguish the reversals of inconsistent telephone facilita-
tion acquittals from the Dunn rule and strongly reaffirmed the validity
of the rule itself."1 2 The Court presented a detailed analysis of the fac-
tors embodied in the Dunn rule. First, courts are not able to interpret
the reasons for a jury acquittal."' Second, the jury's power to exercise
leniency is valuable." 4 Third, courts should not speculate about jury
deliberations." 5 Finally, evidentiary review safeguards against errone-
ous verdicts."" These factors make clear the continuing relevancy and
appropriateness of the Dunn approach to inconsistent verdicts in the
American criminal justice system.
When a jury renders a truly inconsistent verdict, "it is unclear
whose ox has been gored."11 7 Such a verdict is ambiguous as to which
of the convictions or acquittals the jury really meant. Under these cir-
cumstances, as one court has noted, "it might be possible to speculate
indefinitely as to what paths the jury followed in reaching its conclu-
sions .... [Yet] . . .we have no reliable way to discover what lies
behind . inconsistent verdicts.""" Furthermore, as the Powell Court
noted, the double jeopardy clause" 9 insulates a jury acquittal from ju-
dicial review. Under these circumstances, the Court recognized that to
invalidate a jury's conviction on the basis of its inconsistent acquittal
improperly assumes the validity of the acquittal, which is neither sub-
ject to review nor susceptible to interpretation.'2"
Thus, it is clear that the Powell Court accepted the Dunn ration-
110 See United States v. Powell, 708 F.2d 455, 456 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied, 719
F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1254, rev'd, 469 U.S. 57 (1984). On
denying the government's petition for rehearing, however, the Ninth Circuit stated that
its result was an "exception[] to the application of the Dunn rule." 719 F.2d at 1480.
"' Powell, 708 F.2d at 456; accord United States v. Bailey, 607 F.2d 237, 245
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980).
112 See Powell, 469 U.S. at 62-67.
111 See id. at 64-65.
"1 See id. at 65-66.
115 See id. at 66-67.
116 See id.
17 Id. at 65.
118 DeSacia v. State, 469 P.2d 369, 378 (Alaska 1970).
"9 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see supra note 64.
110 See Powell, 469 U.S. at 65-67.
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ale that inconsistent verdicts are often a product of jury lenity.121 The
jury's acquittal may be based on extralegal factors irrelevant to the va-
lidity of the conviction. One commentator has suggested that this posi-
tion is merely an assumption and that "[rjeliance on such an assump-
tion is a serious breach of the systematic protections designed to ensure
a sound basis for conviction of criminal defendants. ' 122 An examination
of the factors underlying this assumption, however, reveals that the
Dunn doctrine does not reflect a wholesale rejection of defendants'
rights, but a prudent balancing of the role of the jury and the need to
ensure the accuracy of criminal convictions.
The Powell Court's assertion that verdict inconsistency "often" re-
sults from juries' exercises of leniency has not been tested empiri-
cally.1 23 Aside from the question of how often jurors exercise such leni-
ency, it must be recognized that to require consistency in all jury
verdicts would severely limit their ability to exercise leniency at all.
Under the rule of consistency a jury could not acquit one defendant on
the basis of leniency without being forced to acquit the other as well. A
jury may well forego any acquittal if that is the only possible result. A
jury should be able to apply leniency in "the difficult cases where [it]
wishes to avoid an all-or-nothing verdict,"124 regardless of the inconsis-
tency in results thereby produced. Though some commentators question
the jury's ability to exercise such discretion properly,12 5 the result in
Powell implicitly recognizes:
Law and Justice are from time to time inevitably in conflict.
That is because law is a general rule . . . ; while justice is
the fairness of this precise case under all its circumstances.
121 See id. at 65.
22 Wax, Inconsistent and Repugnant Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 24 N.Y.L.
Scl. L. REv. 713, 739 (1979).
123 The Powell Court's assertion, however, is supported by the literature concern-
ing the impact of extralegal factors on jury decisions. In H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY (1966), the authors collected judges' reports on over 3500 crimi-
nal trials in order to assess both the extent of and reasons for juries' deviations from the
judges' views of the legally prescribed results in these trials. Particularly relevant in the
context of inconsistent verdicts is the study's descriptions of the "sympathetic defend-
ant," a defendant particularly appealing to the jury in terms of sex, race, age, appear-
ance, courtroom demeanor, and other factors, as a substantial and consistent source of
judge-jury disagreement, see id. at 193-218, and of the juries' tendency to exercise leni-
ency where a defendant's misfortunes resulting from the commission of the crime lead
them to believe that she has been "punished enough." See id. at 301-05. This study
indicates a substantial basis for the Powell Court's conclusion that, in the context of
inconsistent verdicts, it is not unlikely that extralegal factors have played a role in the
jury's decision.
124 Powell, 469 U.S. at 65-66 (citing Bickel, supra note 104, at 652).
125 See Note, Toward Principles of Jury Equity, 83 YALE L.J. 1023, 1026-28
(1974) (discussing criticisms of jury sovereignty).
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* . . The jury. . . adjusts the general rule of law to the
justice of the particular case.
. . . It supplies that flexibility of legal rules which is
essential to justice and popular contentment.
1 26
The jury's ability to interpose its own sense of justice between the
rigor of legal principle and the equities of a particular case underlies
"the jury's historic function, in criminal trials, as a check against arbi-
trary or oppressive exercises of power by the Executive Branch."12
The jury's ability to deliver an inconsistent verdict permits the commu-
nity to provide its judgment on whether the punishment fits the crime.
To deny the jury this power is a serious encroachment on its essential
function. If courts were to analyze and dismiss jury verdicts for incon-
sistencies, " 'they would miss the very thing for which they are looking,
the opinion of the country.' ""28 Thus, the Powell Court's reaffirmation
of the Dunn doctrine is based in part upon its recognition of the jury's
role as a guardian of individual liberty, at the cost of verdicts which on
occasion are legally "incorrect."
Furthermore, as the Powell Court noted, an attempt to assess the
consistency of a jury verdict "would be based either on pure specula-
tion, or would require inquiries into the jury's deliberations that courts
generally will not undertake." '29 Such post hoc examinations of juries'
deliberative processes have been limited in the federal courts to cases of
"extraneous influences" on the processes, including outside publicity re-
ceived by jurors, consideration by the jury of evidence not admitted in
court, and jurors' communications with third parties. 3° In contrast,
"matters which essentially inhere in the verdict itself,"1 31 including
both "the mental process of any juror or the jury in arriving at a ver-
dict"132 and "the method by which the verdict is reached,"' 33 are not
138 Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of Jury Trial, 12 J. AM. JUDICATURE
Soc'y 166, 170 (1929); see also Note, supra note 125, at 1028-54 (discussing support
for jury sovereignty and suggesting that jurors share commonly held notions of equity).
137 Powell, 469 U.S. at 65.
13. United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 908 (2d Cir. 1960) (quoting 2 F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 624 (2d ed. 1898)).
129 Powell, 469 U.S. at 66.
130 See United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 151-52 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United
States v. Wilson, 534 F.2d 375, 378-79 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Government of the Virgin
Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 149-50 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917
(1976).
131 Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 384 (1912).
132 Capella v. Baumgartner, 59 F.R.D. 312, 315 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
"' Gereau, 523 F.2d at 149.
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competent to impeach a jury verdict."3 4 This distinction relies on the
traditional sovereignty of the jury as the "voice of the country": where
the defendant has received a fair trial, and where no outside forces have
distorted the jury's message, its conclusion should not be questioned.13 5
Thus, absent allegations of extraneous influences on the jury, verdict
inconsistency should not be interpreted as more than "the give-and-take
within [the] microcosm of the community." ' "[T]hrough this defer-
ence," the Powell Court noted, "the jury brings to the criminal process,
in addition to the collective judgment of the community, an element of
needed finality.
137
Underlying these notions of jury sovereignty is the Powell Court's
recognition that criminal defendants are already "afforded protection
against jury irrationality or error by the independent review of the suf-
ficiency of the evidence undertaken by the trial and appellate
courts." 138 Under the federal rules, a defendant may move for acquittal
"if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction" after the evidence
on either side is closed,13 9 and where the jury returns a verdict of
guilty.140 Due process requires that before an accused can be convicted,
the prosecution must present "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 4 Re-
cently, in Jackson v. Virginia,42 the Court clarified the proof beyond a
reasonable doubt standard. To meet the standard on review of a convic-
tion, it must be found that "the record evidence could reasonably sup-
-port a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 14 Thus, where a
jury's conviction on one count is inconsistent with its acquittals on
others, both the trial and the appellate courts may directly review the
substance of the evidence supporting that conviction for sufficiency.
Where such evidence is in fact found sufficient, an interpretation of
such inconsistencies as unreviewable products of jury lenity is war-
ranted, and absent a showing of jury misconduct, necessary to preserve
the role of the criminal jury. Evidentiary review ensures that the pres-
ervation of jury sovereignty through tolerance of verdict inconsistency
1s4 See id. at 148-50.
"I See id. at 149-50 (distinguishing between extra-jury and intra-jury influences).
136 United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
137 Powell, 469 U.S. at 67.
138 Id.
139 FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a).
140 FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c).
141 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
142 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
143 Id. at 318; see also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942) ("The
verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most
favorable to the Government, to support it.").
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will not be at the expense of the defendant's fundamental right to a
reliable conviction.
3. The Rule of Consistency and the Dunn Doctrine
of Inconsistent Verdicts
The Supreme Court's approval of inconsistent verdicts springs
from its recognition that a criminal acquittal may arise from jury leni-
ency or other extralegal factors, and thus that acquittal is not disposi-
tive of a defendant's innocence "in the sense of having done the act
charged."' 4 4 This recognition underlies the Court's refusal to extend
nonmutual collateral estoppel to an accessory following the acquittal of
the principal in Standefer v. United States.145 Furthermore, that evi-
dence may be inadmissible in the principal's trial but admissible
against the accessory may also explain an inconsistent verdict.'
Application of the rule of consistency in joint conspiracy trials
where only one of two or more defendants is convicted also presents
these difficulties. First, evidence may be admissible against only one of
two conspiracy defendants, rendering such a result only superficially
inconsistent. Further, even where no such evidentiary problems exist,
the Supreme Court's Dunn and Powell analyses ultimately require in-
terpretation of the inconsistent verdicts as an exercise by the jury of its
power to acquit for extralegal reasons. As in Standefer, then, such an
acquittal is of no relevance to the validity of an inconsistent conviction.
Lastly, the rejection of the nonmutual estoppel doctrine in criminal
cases in Standefer was based on the possibility that a jury acquittal
might contain irrationality. A jury verdict convicting only one of several
conspiracy defendants clearly indicates that the jury has not followed
the judge's directions. In a strictly legal sense, such a verdict lacks a
rational basis. Where this is so, according to Powell, "principles of col-
lateral estoppel-which are predicated on the assumption that the jury
acted rationally and found certain facts in reaching its verdict-are no
longer useful.' 147 Thus, the rule of consistency, which operates to bar a
jury conviction of one conspirator based on its own acquittal of a fellow
conspirator, is itself inconsistent with the principles of collateral estop-
144 Bickel, supra note 104, at 652.
146 447 U.S. 10 (1980).
1 6 See id. at 22-24. The Standefer Court noted, finally, that "the important fed-
eral interest in the enforcement of the criminal law" outweighs the concerns of judicial
economy underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See id. at 24-25. Because this
Comment concerns inconsistent verdicts rendered by a single jury, the interest of judi-
cial economy is not of primary concern.
147 Powell, 469 U.S. at 68.
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pel underlying the Standefer decision and with the fundamental accept-
ability of such verdicts embodied in the Court's Dunn and Powell
decisions.
This Comment proposes, then, that the rule of consistency, even in
its presently narrow application,'4 8 has no subsisting validity and
should be abandoned. In place of this mechanical rule, which operates
to invalidate automatically any jury conspiracy verdict containing an
apparent inconsistency, a reviewing court should simply examine the
inconsistent conviction for evidentiary support. A recent First Circuit
decision, United States v. Cyr,' 8 although falling within the "separate
trials" exception to the rule of consistency, serves to illustrate the
proper disposition of an inconsistent conspiracy verdict in the absence
of a per se rule of consistency. In this case, the defendants, C, a would-
be restaurateur, B and K, business associates of C, and M, a bank loan
officer, were indicted for, inter alia, conspiring to misapply bank funds
in connection with a wide-ranging scheme of loans fraudulently ob-
tained for the use of C's restaurant business. The trial jury convicted C
but acquitted K and M on the conspiracy count.' 50 In response to C's
challenge to the consistency of this conviction, the court first noted, in
accordance with Dunn, that a jury's verdict should not be set aside
solely on grounds of inconsistency.'' Next, the court noted that it was
"clear that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that [C
and M] conspired together to misapply bank funds .... "5' Finally,
the court, though recognizing that it was under no obligation to do so,
pointed out several factors that may have produced the inconsistency in
results, including that only C personally profited from the loans, that
there was testimony indicating M's honesty and integrity, and that ac-
cording to C's own testimony "she was responsible for [M's] down-
fall.'1 5 3 The court's enumeration of these factors suggests at the very
least that circumstances evoking jury compassion and leniency can and
do arise within the ambit of a conspiracy trial. Accordingly, the Cyr
court properly limited its review of the lone conspiracy conviction to the
148 See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
149 712 F.2d 729 (1st Cir. 1983).
150 See id. at 731-32.
See id. at 732 (quoting Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 354 (1981)). In Cyr,
one of the alleged conspirators became ill during the trial, and therefore received a
severance. Thus, the "separate trials" exception to the rule of consistency seems to have
barred the application of the rule in this case. The court does not mention the rule in
its opinion. Under the reasoning of the court and this Comment, however, the presence
and acquittal of this defendant would not, but for the rule of consistency, have affected
its result.
152 Id. at 734.
158 Id.
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sufficiency of the evidence. Under the principles enumerated by the Su-
preme Court in Standefer, Dunn, and Powell, a defendant is "entitled
to no less-and to no more."
1 54
CONCLUSION
The essence, and fundamental flaw, of the rule of consistency lies
in the assumption that a jury acquittal conclusively demonstrates a de-
fendant's lack of involvement in a criminal transaction. Such an as-
sumption is incompatible with the Supreme Court's well-settled ap-
proval of inconsistent verdicts and its recognition that criminal
acquittals may result from a number of factors unrelated to a defend-
ant's guilt, including the inadmissibility of evidence and the exercise of
lenity by a jury.
For these reasons, the ultimate effect of the rule of consistency
may often be a purposeless grant of immunity to one defendant based
on factors personal to a codefendant and ultimately unrelated to the
actual existence of a conspiracy. As such, review of inconsistent con-
spiracy convictions should be limited to consideration of the sufficiency
of the supporting evidence and should disregard the legally irrelevant
acquittals of a conspirator's lucky cohorts.
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